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Abstract
This article aims to uncover the key preconditions and characteristics of post-truth 
as well as the contextual factors explaining its appeal. The key factor appears to be post-
truth’s ability to incite pleasure, in terms of both it being unconstrained by veracity and 
the advance and the capacity to know what the necessary pleasure-inciting variables are 
through big data analysis. That neatly corresponds with the general rise to prominence 
of satisfaction and affective mobilisation in competition over increasingly scarce audi-
ence attention, making post-truth a distinctly contemporary phenomenon.
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Resumen
Este artículo tiene como objetivo descubrir las precondiciones y características clave 
de la posverdad, así como los factores contextuales que explican su atractivo. El factor 
clave parece ser la capacidad de la posverdad para incitar al placer, tanto en el sentido 
de no estar restringida por la veracidad, como de avance y capacidad de saber cuáles son 
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las variables necesarias que incitan al placer a través del análisis de los big data. Eso se 
corresponde perfectamente al ascenso general del peso de la satisfacción y movilización 
afectiva en la competición por atención cada vez más escasa de la audiencia, lo que hace 
de la posverdad un fenómeno claramente contemporáneo.
Palabras clave 
Posverdad, big-data, placer, afecto.
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Post-truth is one of those concepts that are often discussed and rarely understood 
and, paradoxically, the more it is discussed, the less it is understood. Consequently, it is 
of prime importance to delve into the substance and form of post-truth in order to bet-
ter understand its proper place in today’s political life. Several key themes are revealed 
to be of prime importance.
First, the role of post-truth narratives is to provide satisfaction through con-
firmation of audience wishes, desires, stereotypes, etc., simultaneously also guid-
ing individuals through the complexities of everyday lives in the information-sat-
urated communication environment. The latter function is particularly reinforced 
through post-truth-claims, typically formulated as narratives and, therefore, acting as 
sense-making structures. Moreover, there is a reason why such post-truth narratives 
have become not only more prevalent but also more effective than ever before: it is 
due to the availability of data about target audiences and the technological capacity 
of gauging through massive sets of such data. The audience characteristics that need 
to be toyed with can now be known in advance, enabling the creation of narratives 
that, due to post-truth’s disregard for verifiable facts, can be shaped and tailored in 
whichever way necessary.
The second part of the article mostly deals with the contextual conditions of post-
truth, primarily the general drive towards pleasurisation, prevalent across societal do-
mains and clearly manifesting itself within the media ecosystem. The ever-increasing 
competition between media content providers and, therefore, the scarcity of audience 
attention are the key driving forces behind this pleasurisation: one simply has to offer 
greater consumer satisfaction than any of the competing offerings, leading to both 
increasingly egregious claims and communicative behaviours, such as trolling. That 
has unavoidably led to a high level of me-centricity among the audiences, resulting in 
an expectation that communication acts, including truth-claims (and the truths that 
they postulate), revolve around the individual. Moreover, as the audiences themselves 
have become increasingly fragmented, the flow of affective reactions to events, in-
formation, or claims becomes a key factor that either affiliates or splits communities. 
Overall, then, due to the neat fit with today’s trends and technological affordances, 
post-truth is seen as a highly potent development.
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Telling It as the Audiences Like It
In a general sense, Post-truth should be understood as progressive erasure of the 
truth/falsehood distinction while uttering statements (and, from an audience per-
spective, deciding on the currency of such statements). Part and parcel of this erasure 
is prioritisation of affective identification with truth-claims over more conventional 
reasoned decision-making processes (for a more extensive elaboration of this view, 
see Kalpokas, 2019). The preceding definition is expansive enough to account for both 
the more egregious manifestations of post-truth, such as Trump or the Brexiteers, 
and more the broader changes in political communication, such as the mainstream-
isation of trolling as a political practice. Indeed, the aforementioned irrelevance of 
the truth-falsehood distinction is crucial: if post-truth was about concealing facts, 
it would merely amount to old-fashioned lying. Meanwhile, if post-truth involved 
the expectation that ‘the crowd’s reaction actually does change the facts about a lie’, 
as McIntyre (2018, p 9) suggests, then post-truth would perhaps signify a sudden 
explosion of sheer madness. In fact, nobody expects the facts to change – what mat-
ters is only the public preference for one set of claims over another, both sets being 
mutually exclusive. Since the very relationship of facts to verifiable reality (previously 
the benchmark of facticity) has become unimportant, there is no need for the facts to 
change in the first place.
Of course, the fluid relationship of post-truth claims with verifiable reality accords 
a significant degree of freedom to politicians willing to embrace the new communi-
cative-political environment. Being unconstrained by objective conditions, political 
actors can tailor their claims in a way that specifically and intentionally answers the 
needs, wishes, preconceptions, and desires of the target audiences. As a result, post-
truth political actors basically become screens onto which the electorate projects their 
wishes, fears, and desires (Hauser, 2018), whatever their relation to verifiable facts is. In 
this way, people obtain the pleasure of having their preconceptions, stereotypes, desires, 
and hopes confirmed and, since pleasurable results of our previous choices reinforce 
a repetition of choice patterns (de Haan & Linde, 2018, p. 1204), such politicians can 
easily get into the habit of opting for post-truth. Hence, we can say with confidence that 
adherence to pleasurable affect is learned as we go. And once we have learned that a 
particular stimulus (or source of stimuli), such as a source or a particular type of news 
(even if they are fake) helps maximise our satisfaction, it is only natural that we repeat 
our custom. Post-truth can, therefore, be seen as aspirational, i.e. as presenting a better 
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picture of ourselves or of the future than would be possible if relying on verifiable facts 
(McGranahan, 2017, p. 246), thus further adding to the attractiveness of non-factual 
content.
On the other hand, it would be erroneous to think of post-truth politics exclusive-
ly in terms of doom and gloom. Somewhat paradoxically, it might be asserted that 
in today’s culture of “constant promotionalism” which demands “hyper-competitive, 
self-branding, bragging, hyperbole” (Harsin, 2017, p. 515), and constant “work on the 
self ” in order to earn an actual or imaginary competitive edge (Lazzarato, 2014), a post-
truth politician is perhaps the most truthful one of all, their utterances being merely 
more dramatic versions of what many potential voters would themselves do at a job 
interview or whilst polishing their social media presence. This is also why much of what 
post-truth politicians do should be interpreted as signalling, i.e. making oneself or one’s 
position clearly evident through something costly or outlandish. As Davis (2017) as-
serts, “sometimes, what you think is bullshit is actually a costly signal delivering useful 
information” (p. 85). In other words, even if the factual veracity of the claim is not nec-
essarily sold on everyone, the claim is likely to be effective nonetheless as an indicator of 
where the relevant actor stands on a given issue, and the more outlandish the statement, 
the more unmissable it is, and the more it serves as an illustration that the actor has tak-
en the effort to assert themselves and their stance and to satisfy their target audience. All 
that, in combination, is likely to be taken as a sign of care and attention by the relevant 
segments of the electorate.
Still, completely random claims, however appealing, would not be effective enough 
to produce collective results. Instead, truth claims, regardless of their veracity, must fall 
into narrative structures that explain and give meaning to everyday life. Essentially, as 
the rise of post-truth has demonstrated, “truth, as in fact or piece of information, has 
no intrinsic value”: instead, “it is up to the narrative to create that value” (Holmstrom, 
2015, p. 124). However, the narrative itself has a very dubious relation to truth: to be 
more precise, “the truth in the narrative is (…) not in its verifiability, but in its verisimil-
itude – the appearance of it being real or true” (Holmstrom, 2015, p. 124). In particular, 
people need a catchy and convenient narrative because it “provides explanations”, i.e. 
“describes the past, justifies the present, and presents a vision of the future”: while hav-
ing increasing amounts of pure information “only muddles our understanding of the 
world”, clear-cut narratives, regardless of their veracity, seemingly put things back in 
order by providing “relevant information, talking points, and an explanation of how the 
topic in question fits into their worldview” (Holmstrom, 2015, p. 120-121). Narratives 
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“explain the world and set constraints on the imaginable and actionable, and shape per-
ceived interests” (Roselle, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2014, p. 76). Indeed, a narrative 
that gives sense to the disparate elements off representation and also makes one feel like 
(s)he is part of the story being told, hence encouraging to emotionally and otherwise 
invest in a particular issue under description. Moreover, narratives help to sift through 
the noise and conflicting information that one is now permanently bombarded with by 
offering a simple and seemingly uncontroversial answer, which (re)establishes the order 
of things. Where previously one encountered only a cornucopia of disparate things, now 
one encounters an ordered totality, which makes sense as to how the status quo has de-
veloped, its normative value (good or bad), and direction of action (protect or change). 
Hence, narratives, post-truth or not, are efficient means of dealing with information 
overload. And, again, post-truth narratives have a clear advantage in this context: if one 
is unconstrained by factual reality, it is much easier to concoct a narrative that provides 
easier, clearer, and more palatable explanations that fit audience preconceptions, de-
sires, and aspirations than a more truthful alternative would.
The changes inherent in today’s communication environment, including construc-
tion of post-truth narratives, must be understood in relation to advances in big data 
analysis. In a general sense, Big data refers to unprecedently large agglomerations of 
data that include “emails, videos, audios, images, click streams, logs, posts, search que-
ries, health records, and more” (Kemper & Kolkman, 2018, p. 1). In effect, big data can 
be seen as a byword for the entirety of the digital traces of our lives and, therefore, (al-
most) complete information about our lives. The prime use for big data is as an input to 
(and increasingly as the basis of) decision-making processes. Instead of abstract models 
and rules that can never be fully precise, big data is claimed to reveal “the heterogeneity 
and multiplicity of the world” (Chandler, 2015, p. 850), i.e. to give a real-time actual 
representation of the world in all its granular detail. As stressed by Faraj et al. (2018), 
such capacity to collect and analyse information, compose descriptive and predictive 
accounts of the world and customise one’s approach towards specific individuals, in-
cluding tailored messaging leveraging “aspects of personality, political leanings, and 
affective proclivities” should not be seen as an aberration of sorts but, instead, as “the 
culmination of the digital quantification logic” (p. 64). Such datafied processes direct, 
among other things, the selection of information that we encounter, primarily (but not 
exclusively) on social media and as search results: the information to be displayed to 
us is chosen as ‘relevant’, i.e. as congruent with the data that is available about us (see 
e.g. Vaidhyanathan, 2018). Crucially, such algorithmic ranking and selection of content 
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directly affects “not only what we think about (agenda-setting) but also how we think 
about it (framing) and consequently how we act” thus shaping the realities lived by indi-
viduals and, through them, social order (Just & Latzer, 2017, p. 245-246). As a result, the 
lived realities and social orders inhabited by individuals increasingly find their ground-
ing not in facts that apply to everyone universally but in the subjective characteristics 
of target audiences.
It is definitely convenient for actors willing to maximise the appeal of their narra-
tives, at the expense of veracity if necessary, if the key building blocks that need to be 
included are known in advance, and big data analysis offers precisely that. However, 
there are also further developments that merit attention. First, we are still used to the 
traditional idea of a narrative as something that has a beginning, middle, and end, i.e. 
of narrative as a linear structure. In big data analysis-enabled construction of narratives 
such linearity is typically absent. That is because the performance of one’s narrative can 
be observed in real time across different segments of the target audiences, particularly 
through techniques such as opinion mining and sentiment analysis (see e.g. Balazs & 
Velásquez, 2016; Giatsoglou et al. 2017; Puschmann & Powell, 2018). As a result, if the 
narrative is not performing as expected with a certain segment, the offering for that 
particular segment can be tweaked so that one part (or more) of the main narrative 
branches out and acquires a life of its own while other segments of the audience contin-
ue being fed with the main version or yet different branches thereof, depending on the 
ways in which satisfaction is best maximised. The consequences reach, of course, be-
yond mere narrative conventions: such splintering of accounts of the social world puts 
into question the entire idea of the public sphere (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018). And if there 
is no more shared public sphere that is, at the very least, constructed through shared 
partaking in discussion of different interpretations of matters of common concern, then 
the distinction between truth and falsehood is eroded even further: no development of 
a shared experience and the necessity to explain and defend your interpretation but it is 
maximisation of satisfaction derived from a narrative regardless of the broader context 
that becomes paramount.
The second development worth noting is an increased opacity in the key nodal 
points of narrative structures. As already indicated, narratives are frequently amended 
and forked as a result of data feedback. However, the analysis of such data that renders 
the latter meaningful is typically carried out by proprietary algorithms, whose the inner 
workings are impossible to know, giving rise to ‘data black boxes’, i.e. routine instances 
whence one can observe the input and the output, but the actual analytic processes 
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remain unclear (see e.g. Müller et al, 2016; Perel, 2017). That, in turn, raises the ques-
tions of agency, transparency, and responsibility. In terms of agency, the question 
concerns the role of the ultimate decision-maker: are political communication and 
campaigning choices still being made by political actors, even though they are in-
creasingly making such decisions on the basis of information the origin of which they 
can neither fully understand or is that agency now more with technology companies 
that create and own the crucial code? A corresponding transparency problem revolves 
around the issue of how both the public and the political actors are to verify the in-
formation upon which decisions are being made if its creation process is intentionally 
opaque. Consequently, one more major issue is who is to be held responsible if deci-
sions made on the basis of such non-transparent information prove to be wrong, not 
only in terms of mismanagement but also in terms of structural changes, such as the 
furthering of post-truth.
Just Give Me Pleasure
To understand today’s politics, one has to first conceive it as a mediatised domain. 
The concept of mediatisation is used in communications studies to denote how today’s 
social world is “changed in its dynamics and structure by the role that media continu-
ously (…) play in its construction”, particularly with regards to how the social world’s 
“forms and patterns are, in part, sustained in and through media and their infrastruc-
tures” (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 15). Under the influence of mediatisation, “core ele-
ments of a social or cultural activity (like work, leisure, play etc.) assume media form” 
(Hjarvard, 2014, p. 48). Part and parcel to this shift, the media “have become an integral 
part of other institutions’ operations, while they also have achieved a degree of self-de-
termination and authority that forces other institutions, to greater or lesser degrees, to 
submit to their logic” (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 106). In specifically political terms, “media-
tisation of politics means the diffusion of a specific media rationality into the sphere 
of the political” (Marcinkowski, 2014, p. 6), implying that political actors respond by 
following media, instead of political, logic (Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2013, p. 342) – at 
least, that is, in democratic societies that enjoy free media. In this environment, political 
claim-making becomes subservient to the demands of the media, which typically means 
that speed, attention-grabbing, and consumer satisfaction take precedence over veracity 
and reasoned discourse.
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Moreover, the media have become integral to the creation of social reality as such 
since they “constitute a realm of shared experience” by offering “a continuous presenta-
tion and interpretation of ‘the way things are’ and by doing so, contribute to the devel-
opment of a sense of identity and of community” (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 126). Moreover, 
moving on to information supply in today’s deeply mediatised (see Couldry & Hepp, 
2017) societies, mere information availability has turned into information overload that 
creates “a temporality that is concerned with ‘the now’, and is stretched and condensed 
in various ways” (Coleman, 2018, p. 68). As a corollary, today’s information overload 
reduces the time available for reflection, meaning that “the management of the flood of 
available knowledge” becomes a key skill and one that necessitates “rapid classification 
of facts as good or bad, likable or not”, often leading to “withdrawal into default beliefs 
and opinions, often those of the group to which one belongs” (Damasio, 2018, p. 215) in 
order to simplify (or, rather, outsource) choice. However, while making the information 
overload easier to bear, this solution simultaneously and severely hinders our ability to 
break out of our filter bubble.
More generally, one can observe a trend towards pleasurisation and capitalisation 
on positive affective experiences in a broad spectrum of social and private activities, 
extending even to something as banal as e.g. chores in the “smart home” (see Strengers 
& Nicholls, 2018), as well as gamification of most areas of life (Papsdorf, 2015), con-
joined with the playful nature of today’s media (see e.g. Sicart, 2014). In political com-
munication as well, emotional triggers have “consistently been found to enhance user 
engagement”, ultimately leading to “emotional content generating higher numbers of 
likes and comments” (Noon Nave et al., 2018, p. 2). This should come as no surprise 
since it is typical for media of all sorts to encourage the consumption of their content 
through affective bonds with particular genres or specific personae in terms of “a partic-
ular energy, mood, or movement” that is even prior to feeling but feeding (or annulling) 
the latter, thereby being both fundamental and even more impulsive and difficult to 
conceive (Papacharissi, 2015, p. 21). Consequently, affective flows provide the basis for 
“the cultivation of subsequent feelings, emotions, thoughts, attitudes, and behaviours”, 
leading, in turn, to an “affect economy”, in which the value of something (an idea, an 
individual actor etc.) is measured by the intensity of reactions that they can evoke 
(p. 23). Once again, affective impact, and not veracity, is key.
In this new condition, political news and current affairs have to compete with 
any other kind of media offering – which typically manifests “intense experiential 
immersions with strong affective valences” – from games and messaging apps to latest 
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celebrity gossip, resulting in “intense and incessant competition for attention” (Dahl-
gren & Alvares, 2013, p. 54). Hence, the key to political ordering power (or, at the very 
least, to achieving influence) is in acquiring the capacity to frame and shape discours-
es – and that is mainly achieved by maximising consumer satisfaction. Moreover, 
the social media environment “collapses storytelling conventions that distinguish fact 
from opinion and from emotion into subjectively narrated realities”, thus disrupting 
dominant narratives with “affectively charged micro-narratives” that enable people 
to “feel their way into their own place in politics” (Papacharissi, 2015, p. 131). Essen-
tially, if all information appears equal and the main distinguishing factor is how one 
feels about a claim, the “me-first” affirmation becomes even more crucial. In this envi-
ronment, action is connective rather than collective whereby, “participation becomes 
self-motivating as personally expressive content is shared with, and recognized by, 
others who, in turn, repeat these networked sharing activities” (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2012, p. 752). The ensuing result is formation of communities united by a shared af-
fective reaction to information, claims, events, trends, etc. (actual as well as alleged), 
i.e. affective communities.
If, as McIntyre (2018) alleges, “the selective use of facts that prop up one’s position, 
and the complete rejection of facts that do not, seems part and parcel of creating the 
new post-truth reality” (p. 34), then we are indeed witnessing a turn towards me-cen-
tric maximisation of affect and experience. Here, the entirety of the world, including 
truth and fact, is expected to be congruent with and, to put it more strongly, revolve 
around, the person making the judgement. This me-congruence criterion should not 
come as a surprise: since people want the “mental models of the world” that they build 
for themselves to be complete, they are likely to accept information that, while factually 
not exactly correct, fills any remaining gaps in pre-existing models, allowing a sense of 
completeness and, therefore, personal fulfilment (Ecker, 2018, p. 80). The reliance on 
experience should, in turn, come as no surprise because “it is the behavioural impulses 
generated by emotions that give or deny humans the energy to act on their perceptions” 
(Markwica, 2018, p. 87), and it generally appears that affects, emotions, and other un-
conscious processes make up around 98 per cent of brain activities while conscious 
reflection makes up merely 2 per cent (see e.g. Franks, 2014). Therefore, whatever plays 
on the emotions relevant at the time, is likely to prevail overall.
There is, of course, a danger in this rise of me-congruence. While certainly empow-
ering by enabling previously neglected or underrepresented standpoints to flourish, the 
ensuing disruptions of hegemonic truths also pose the danger of opening a Pandora’s 
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box of issues that had been neglected for a valid reason, such as bearing no relation to 
reality whatsoever. The problem is even further exacerbated by our unprecedented abil-
ity to immerse ourselves in networks of the similar and the likeminded, thus causing the 
(most likely mistaken) impression that (almost) everybody agrees with us (McIntyre, 
2018, p. 60) and shielding ourselves from competing truth-claims or, at least, arguments 
in support of them. And when it comes to affective exchange, which is pre-cognitive by 
definition, one does not even have to put in conscious effort to seek information that 
props up one’s own position: one only has to side with a pleasure-maximising affect 
through the experiential “click” that the providers of information are at pains to induce. 
Furthermore, due to the ubiquity and personalisation of media use, as manifested by 
near-permanent immersion in smartphones and other devices, such affective stimuli 
increasingly come from the virtual environment (Miller, 2014) of which malleability 
and customisability are key, even though such customisability often comes courtesy not 
of individual agency but of algorithmic governance. Such governance typically comes 
in the form of “hypernudging” individuals (see Yeung, 2017) through a big data-in-
formed process of altering the choice environment in such a way that individuals end 
up ‘freely’ choosing an option prescribed by political, business, or other actors. And 
perhaps the surest way of maximising and maintaining the power of such hypernudging 
is through assignment of individuals into virtual groups and communities, united by 
shared me-congruent affects and experiences.
One reason why assignment into groups reinforces the power of hypernudging has 
already been discussed: the exchange of information and affect further reinforces one’s 
own position. However, there is at least one more reason: affective group formation 
has, as its corollary, disintegration. After all, “when people emotionally, ideologically, 
culturally, or socially align with similar others, they also disalign with the contextually 
unrecognisable other” (Döveling et al., 2018, p. 4). It is in the nature of affective publics 
that they are discursively convened through either similarities or differences in affec-
tive encounters with the world (Papacharissi, 2015, p. 131). It is crucial to stress that 
whereas groups based on more tangible and verifiable criteria, such as information or 
physical encounters, could be more open to negotiation or discussion, affiliation with 
different affective patterns “often invites demarcations of emotional boundaries”, there-
by “leading to the emergence of divergent, even opposing groups of polarization and 
emotion” (Döveling et al., 2018, p. 4). That, in turn, gives rise not only to opposing 
emotional agglomerations but also “affiliative truths” (i.e. highly polarised accounts of 
the environment, leading to immediate siding ‘for’ or ‘against’), resulting in the creation 
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of groups of fans and haters of a particular truth-claim (McGranahan, 2017). Crucially, 
such alignment typically has little to no relation to the veracity of the truth-claim in 
question. However, due to the data-rich nature of algorithmic sorting, ascription, and 
governance, the affective triggers necessary to hypernudge individuals and subsequent-
ly seal them within groups and communities are known in advance from the informa-
tional traces that we leave through the use of search, social media, apps etc., as already 
discussed in relation to big data.
As usual, it might be somewhat unfair to immediately strike an overly dramatic tone. 
Since the data used for algorithmic governance does not come out of nowhere but is 
aggregated while we go about with our everyday lives, it could be easily (and reason-
ably) claimed that any hypernudging thus derived, and affective group formation thus 
induced, in fact reflects our lives in an intimate way – perhaps even before we proper-
ly understand the relevant aspects of our lives. Indeed, as Lury and Wakeford (2012) 
stress, affective interactions would, perhaps, most accurately reflect “the happening of 
the social world – its ongoingness, relationality, contingency, and sensuousness” (p. 2). 
Indeed, since “human bodies are continuously and simultaneously affected by different 
entities and themselves continuously affect others”, their interactions become immersed 
in “a ‘web’ or ‘field’ of affect that has both stable and dynamic properties”, constituting 
ties that “can be longer-lasting or relatively brief, exhibiting dynamic fluctuations” (von 
Scheve, 2018, p. 54). Therefore, once (hyper)nudged into communities reflecting their 
affective patterns, valences, and capacities, individuals end up sustaining their shared 
existence as well as communal knowledge produced and maintained through affective 
exchanges regardless of its (post)-truthfulness. Therefore, to reiterate, we get what we 
(are deemed to) need. And if we seem to possess a predilection towards some form of 
post-truth, then that is what is going to be served to us.
There is, nevertheless, a normative basis for me-centric affective engagement with 
the environment. It is based on the concept of homeostasis that, while usually refer-
ring to self-regulation of processes, should be, in case of humans, extended to refer to 
life beyond its physical minimum, ensuring that “life is regulated within a range that is 
not just compatible with survival but also conducive to flourishing, to a projection of life 
into the future of an organism or a species” (Damasio, 2018, p. 25). A key aspect is the 
inseparability of feelings and physical existence, partly due to the nature of feelings as “a 
cooperative partnership of body and brain, interacting by way of free-ranging chemical 
molecules and nerve pathways” (p. 12), meaning that feelings both react to bodily states 
and also feed back, affecting bodily states as well. Such inseparability of the body and 
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the mind and the presence of affective flows not only between minds but affecting the 
body as well demonstrates a physical need for pleasure and satisfaction: when positive 
affects are encountered, bodily functions are improved and physical, as well as mental, 
well-being increases and vice versa (see, generally, p. 108-109). Hence, post-truth plays 
a key role in ensuring an at least perceived mental quality of life that, in turn, improves 
the bodily one. Thus, what we are dealing with in this article is not mere decadent hedo-
nism – it pertains to newly expanded means of ensuring overall well-being, even if one 
has to go post-truth to achieve it.
In the environment described above, it comes as no surprise that “social media 
management becomes a must” for any aspiring political actor, meaning both self-pre-
sentation and the ability to gauge the affective valences circulating on social media 
and tap into them (Mazzoleni, 2017, p. 142) in order to attempt to shape them in 
accordance with particular political interests. Moreover, since emotion triggering (as 
well as emotion-laden content per se) has been demonstrated to increase user engage-
ment (Noon Nave et al., 2018, p. 2), it becomes highly unreasonable not to make use 
of the trends. In this context, political affiliation should not be treated very differently 
from fandom, referred to as a dynamic and creative “relationship between the indi-
vidual fan, other fans and the fan object” wherein fans themselves play an active role 
in constituting the properties of the object of fandom as well as fandom itself (Dean, 
2017, p. 412). In other words, political offering (a person, a group, a set of ideas, or 
a ‘truth’) is created within the process of being offered in an interrelation between 
the communicators and the audiences through constant flows of affect and affective 
orientations that “help to form bonds between individuals that sustain a sense of com-
munity” (Dean, 2017, p. 413). An important technique for achieving affective affilia-
tion between supporters and making use of identity-forming and identity-affirming 
nature of fan-like political bonds is trolling.
Trolling itself is a multi-faceted phenomenon, despite being perceived, in everyday 
discourse and media representations alike, as merely “a blanket term for any type of 
negatively marked online conduct” (Golf-Papez & Veer, 2017, p. 1339). However, that 
is not necessarily an accurate depiction. While many trolls are, indeed, on a mission to 
inflict harm and distress on others, the more mainstream ones involve everyday internet 
users who simply aim to make fun of things without being intentionally harmful (p. 
1341), simply employing irony, sarcasm, and the language of memes for not only their 
own enjoyment but also that of their online friends. In fact, “trolling can rightly be said 
to be the new normal” (Hannan, 2018, p 220). Hence, as Sanfilippo et al. (2018) claim, 
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“not everyone who engages in the behaviour is, in fact, a troll” and, therefore, a distinc-
tion must be made between mean trolls and light-hearted trolling (p. 35-37). More-
over, the mainstreamisation of trolling has had a notable effect on both everyday and 
political communication as “trolling is now an open practice, in which many trolls no 
longer bother hiding behind fake names and fake pictures’ (Hannan, 2018, p. 220). The 
prevalent use of irony and sarcasm, typical of the language of trolling, has even become 
necessary for drawing attention to oneself and retaining audience attention in a media 
environment where “popularity now competes with logic and evidence as an arbiter of 
truth” and tends to win convincingly while “lengthy, detailed disquisitions do not fare 
well against short, biting sarcasm” (p. 220). Crucially, engagement in trolling is no lon-
ger characteristic to lay citizens only – it has become part of the political mainstream 
as well, with politicians regularly trolling one another online, being trolled by citizens, 
and even ever more often trolling the citizens back, turning trolling into “a new genre of 
political speech” which “has become so common that new norms and expectations have 
quickly developed around it”, turning political trolling into “a media spectacle” (p. 220). 
In this environment, a politician is expected to “expertly troll” an opponent because 
both political commentators and the public are judging their trolling ability (p. 221). 
Trolling as a political practice is particularly apt for affective mobilisation (the latter is 
further strengthened by sarcasm and irony) and makes perfect sense in the context of 
affiliative truths whence, having entangled an audience within a network of affective 
flows, one is essentially preaching to the converted (who are affectively induced to fol-
low). Here, again, veracity becomes subservient to consumer satisfaction: there might 
well be a kernel of truth in one’s trolling, but that truth is not the valuable part.
The valuable part is, once again, the engagement and stimulation of one’s target au-
dience and the ‘stickiness’ of the message, in both substance and style. As long as the 
substance is appealing to the target audience by responding to its tastes, stereotypes, 
fears, insecurities, hopes, desires, etc., irrespective of the veracity of the content, as long 
as that substance is targeted in such a way that individuals are imperceivably nudged 
towards making a prescribed decision, and that is done in a way that attracts audience 
attention and focuses it on what is happening (trolling and signalling are thus two sides 
of the same coin), success is more than likely. And with the availability of data to inform 
communication decision-making, the efficiency of post-truth choices for political ac-
tors can be maximised, while risk of missteps and mishaps can be minimised. However, 
the glaring problem for politics and the public sphere is, of course, that it can all easily 
end in a slippery slope: if one actor engages in post-truth, it becomes irrational (at least 
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from a political effectiveness and chance maximisation point of view) for other actors 
not to follow suit. And if (when) political discourse ultimately fills up with trolls, signal-
lers, and other post-truthers, more and more effort has to be put into standing out of the 
crowd, resulting in ever more outlandish narratives and communication acts.
Conclusion
Post-truth is definitely to be seen as political communication’s answer to the societal 
developments and technological affordances of today. Building on the progressive plea-
surisation of media and society and the availability of data necessary to exploit these 
trends, post-truth politicians are capable of producing narratives that are more than 
likely to captivate audience attention in ways unconstrained by verifiability and rela-
tionship to facts. It is precisely in this neat fit with the current trends that the strength 
and appeal of post-truth lies. Consequently, it is safe to assert that post-truth is the key 
paradigm of today.
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